Europe hold its breath a month ago, when France was on the edge. In the end, The National Rally (RN) failed not only to secure an outright majority in the second round of parliamentary voting but finished third, contrary to predictions that the far-right party was on the cusp of snatching power, given its strong showing in the first round of voting.
Across Europe, far-right parties are experiencing a resurgence, whether nostalgic nationalist, populist nationalist, ultra-conservative with neo-fascist roots, or other variations. The long-standing taboos against voting for extreme right parties, rooted in Europe’s devastating 20th-century wars against Nazis and fascist Italy, are slowly fading. Mainstream political parties, once averse to collaborating with far-right groups, are now more open to such alliances.
Italy, the EU’s third-largest economy, is led by Giorgia Meloni, head of a party with neo-fascist roots. Finland’s far-right nationalists, The Finns, joined last year the coalition government after three months of debate. In Sweden, the anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism Sweden Democrats are the second-largest party in parliament, supporting the right-wing coalition government. In Greece, three hard-right parties entered the parliament in 2023, while in Spain, the nationalist Vox Party exceeded expectations in all last year’s elections. Also, let’s not forget about Orban and his FIDESZ party in Hungary.
In Romania, AUR became the third party in all polls from a party that no one had heard of in 2019, with the chance to have a candidate in the 2nd round of this year’s presidential elections.
So, what’s happening? Are millions of European voters truly swerving towards the far-right, or is this a protest vote? Is it a reflection of the polarization between urban liberal voters and the conservative rest? And what do we even mean when we describe parties as “far-right”?
What we see now is the result of many years of political actions. On one hand, many mainstream politicians have adopted slogans or stances from the far-right in recent years, hoping to diminish their support base. This strategy, however, has inadvertently mainstreamed far-right ideologies. At the same time, several far-right parties in Europe have strategically shifted towards the political center, aiming to attract more centrist voters.
Consider attitudes towards Russia. Historically, many far-right parties, such as Italy’s The League, France’s Marine Le Pen, and Austria’s Freedom Party, maintained close ties with Moscow. However, Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced these party leaders to alter their rhetoric, making their previous affiliations more than just awkward.
This dual movement, mainstream politicians adopting far-right stances and far-right parties moving towards the center, creates a complex political landscape, challenging our traditional definitions and perceptions of the far-right.
Let’s see another example of the far-right parties “centrification”: after the UK’s Brexit vote in 2016, Brussels feared a domino effect – Frexit, Dexit, Italexit. At the time, many European countries had deeply Eurosceptic populist parties performing well. Over the years, however, those parties have felt obliged to stop agitating to leave the EU or its euro currency, deeming such moves too radical for many European voters. The social and political impacts of Brexit in the UK, never mind the hotly-debated economic consequences, led many to conclude that exiting the EU would further destabilize an already volatile world – consider the COVID pandemic, the threat of aggressive and unpredictable Russia, concerns about China, and the struggle with soaring living costs, with millions of European families still suffering the after-effects of the 2008 economic crisis.
Polls indicate that the EU is more popular among Europeans now than it has been in years. Consequently, far-right parties were shifting their rhetoric from leaving the EU to reforming it, and the prediction to perform strongly in the elections for the European Parliament was correct. Now, we have three political groups consisting of Eurosceptics or sovereigntists: PfE, ECR and ESN.
It is clear the far-right renaissance in Europe is largely due to dissatisfaction with the political mainstream. This widespread dissatisfaction is driving many voters to consider far-right options as alternatives to the status quo.
Many voters in Europe are attracted to the outspokenness of far-right parties, driven by frustration with traditional politicians who seem to lack clear answers in three key areas:
- Identity issues: there is a fear of open borders and an erosion of national identity and traditional values.
- Economics: there is a rejection of globalization and resentment that future generations are not assured a better future.
- Social justice: there is a feeling that national governments are not in control of the rules that govern the lives of citizens.
The growing appeal of far-right parties underscores a widespread desire for clear, decisive answers to complex issues of identity, economics, and social justice. As mainstream politicians struggle to address these concerns, far-right parties are capitalizing on the dissatisfaction, positioning themselves as the champions of national identity, economic stability, and social control. In the face of these changes, the key question remains: can mainstream political forces adapt and respond effectively to the concerns driving voters towards the far-right, or we will see a continued shift towards more extreme political positions?
